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Abstract
We study the role and structure of commodity taxes when consumption and labor supplies are
determined through a bargaining procedure between spouses, and where an optimal income tax
is also available. We focus on the question whether there should be di¤erences in tax treatment
between femaleand maleproducts. When weights (as well as wages) di¤er across couples,
the heterogeneity is multidimensional and the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem does not apply. In
addition, when the social welfare function is individual-based, spousessocial weights may di¤er
from their weights within the couples. This brings about Pigouvian considerations which in
themselves may justify commodity taxes. We show that the expressions for the tax rates include
Pigouvian and incentive terms. Their roles are most apparent in the case where some goods are
consumed exclusively by one of the spouses. Supposing, for instance, that the female spouse
has the lower bargaining weight, we nd conditions under which the Pigouvian term calls for
a subsidization of the female good, and a taxation of the male good. The incentive term
depends on the distribution of bargaining weights across couples. For instance, for the exclusive
consumption case, when the weight of the female spouse increases with wages, the female good
tends to be consumed in larger proportion by more productive couples. Consequently, the
incentive term makes it a candidate for taxation. In this case the Pigouvian term is mitigated.
Keywords: Couplestaxation, household bargaining, optimal commodity taxation
JEL classication: H21, H31, D10
1 Introduction
This paper brings together two issues which have hitherto been studied separately. The rst
one is the role and the design of commodity taxation and the second one is the tax treatment
of couples. More precisely, this paper studies the optimal structure of commodity taxes, in a
world where consumption and labor supply decisions are made by couples according to some
bargaining procedure between spouses and where an optimal income tax is also available. We
focus on the question whether there should be di¤erences in tax treatment between femaleand
male products remaining agnostic for the time being about the precise denition of these
categories.
The recent debate about the tampon taxillustrates the policy relevance of the underlying
issue and shows a case where the gender specic classication of the good is hardly debatable.
Until recently tampons were in most EU countries taxed at the regularVAT rate (around 20%)
, as opposed to the reduced rate (5% or even 0%) which applies to an often ill dened category
of necessities.1 Women activists had for long staged vehement protests. Finally, in 2016 the
EU commission (which has to approve reductions in VAT rates to levels below 15%) gave its
green light and several countries including France and the UK (but not Germany) adopted the
reduced rates for tampons. The debate was based more on emotions than on economic arguments
but, in any event, taxation theory has little to say so far about the taxation of gender specic
consumption goods. In particular, it is not clear if there is any good reason to extend the
preferential tax treatment to other female goods like perfume, or womens clothing.
The role of commodity taxes is probably one of the most prominent or, at least, one of the
oldest issues of taxation policy; see Atkinson (1977). The traditional Ramsey type models which
typically advocated nonuniform commodity taxes have received a rather fatal blow by the classic
contribution of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). In their seminal work, they show that, under some
conditions (weak separability of preferences in labor supply and goods), an optimal nonlinear
income tax is su¢ cient to implement any incentive compatible Pareto-e¢ cient allocation. In
other words, commodity taxes are redundant (or should be uniform). It is by now well under-
stood though that the Atkinson and Stiglitz result has its limitations. In particular, it may not
hold under uncertainty (Cremer and Gahvari, 1997) and does not apply under multi-dimensional
heterogeneity, for instance, when individuals di¤er in preferences (Cremer, Gahvari and Ladoux,
1Which in the UK includes ostrich meat and helicopters, but neither toothpaste nor
toilet paper. For a brief summary of the tampon tax controversy see, for instance,
www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2016/03/tampon-tax
1
1998; and Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet, 2001). When demand behavior is determined by cou-
ples according to a bargaining procedure, and weights di¤er across couples, we are within such
a multidimensional setting. In addition, when the social welfare function is individual based,
spousessocial weights may di¤er from their weight within the couple which brings about pater-
nalistic or Pigouvian considerations which in themselves may justify commodity taxes (Cremer,
Gahvari and Ladoux, 1998).
The literature on couples income taxation, though more recent, is also quite substantial.
Following the pioneering paper by Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) many authors have studied the
taxation of couples both within linear and nonlinear settings.2 All of these studies concentrate
on income taxation and, in particular, the determination of the tax base (with individual or
joint taxation as extreme cases). Typically a single consumption good exists so that the issue
of commodity taxation does not arise. Additionally, most of these papers consider couples
as unitary, and their preferences are represented by what is essentially an individual utility
function.3
Cremer, Lozachmeur, Maldonado and Roeder (2016), which is the predecessor to the current
paper, departs from this unitary couple paradigm and considers bargaining between spouses.
They show that this has striking implications for the design of income tax policy. It a¤ects the
incentive properties of the nonlinear income tax scheme and introduces Pigouvian considera-
tions into the determination of the spousesmarginal income tax rates. A crucial and rather
plausible assumption of their paper is that, while spousesincomes are publicly observable, the
consumption levels of individual spouses are not observable. In other words, the allocation of
the households disposable income between spouses is not publicly observable. The Pigouvian
elements of the income tax aim at correctingthe levels of labor supply. This is because from an
utilitarian perspective the high-weight spouse tends to work too little. However, while bargaining
yields consumption levels for the individual spouses that are also di¤erent from the utilitarian
ones, the income tax has no leverage on the allocation of the consumption budget within cou-
ples. An appropriately designed commodity tax, on the other hand, can a¤ect spousesbudget
shares and their (real) consumption budget as long as the male and the female spouse have
di¤erent tastes. In other words, as long as spending patterns are gender specic, a nonuniform
commodity tax provides some partial control of individual consumption levels.
2See for instance, Apps and Rees (1988; 1999); Brett (2007); Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2012); Kleven,
Kreiner and Saez (2009); Schroyen (2003).
3An exception is Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Verdelin (2011).
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To study this issue, we introduce commodity taxes into a setting which is otherwise similar
to Cremer et al. (2016). In particular, couples di¤er in wages and in their bargaining weights.
There is an optimal nonlinear income tax scheme based on spousesincomes which are observable.
Individual consumption levels of the di¤erent goods are not publicly observable, but anonymous
transactions are observable. Consequently, a linear commodity tax is feasible on informational
grounds. By now this is the traditional information structure considered in mixed taxation
models.
We determine the structure of commodity taxes which maximizes a utilitarian welfare func-
tion based on individual utilities. We show that the expressions for the tax rates include Pigou-
vian and incentive terms. Their respective role is most apparent in the exclusiveconsumption
case, where one good is consumed exclusively by the female spouse while another good is ex-
clusively consumed by the male spouse. Assuming that, for instance, the female spouse has
the lower bargaining weight, we nd conditions under which the Pigouvian term calls for sub-
sidization of the female good and taxation of the male good. The incentive term depends on
the distribution of bargaining weights across couples. For the exclusive consumption case, when
the weight of the female spouse increases with wages, and when the demand for the female is
su¢ ciently elastic with respect to the female weight the good will tend to be consumed in larger
proportion by more productive couples. Consequently, the incentive term makes it a candidate
for taxation. Intuitively, under these circumstances a subsidization of the female good would be
regressive. The incentive term then mitigates the Pigouvian term and may even reverse it. This
is likely to be the case for perfumes while the weight (and thus income) elasticity is likely to be
small for tampons so that one can expect the Pigouvian term to dominate.
The idea that commodity taxes may be used as a device to redistribute within households has
been explored by Bargain and Donni (2014).4 However, these authors consider a representative
agent (or rather couple) Ramsey setting. Our study di¤ers in two main respects. First, we
consider heterogenous couples so that redistribution between couples also matters. Second, and
most signicantly, we depart from the Ramsey setting by considering an optimal income tax. Put
di¤erently, we derive the Pareto e¢ cient policy given the information structure. We know from
Atkinson and Stiglitz that this changes the nature of the problem in a dramatic way. The role of
an extra instrument in this setting is no longer revenue raising, nor redistribution (at least not
directly) but to contribute to the screening for the unobservable characteristics. Interestingly,
4Blacklow and Ray (2003) consider a related problem. They present an empirical analysis which shows how
the spousesrespective spending behavior can be used to design a tax reform.
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though, some of the results of Bargain and Donni (2014) continue to hold, at least in a qualitative
way. Their revenue raising (e¢ ciency) term is no longer present in our expressions. However,
the term they refer to as redistributiveis the counterpart to our Pigouvian terms; both arise
because social and private weights di¤er. The structure of the term is somewhat di¤erent, but the
main idea that the term calls for a subsidization of the good consumed by the low-weight spouse
is already reected in their expression. However, in our setting intra household redistribution
and inter household redistribution may be in conict. The latter is reected by the incentive
term which has no counterpart in the Ramsey setting.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the economic frame-
work and analyzes the couples optimization problem. Section 3 determines the optimal tax
policy. An in depth analysis of the optimal tax structure is given by Sections 4 and 5. Specif-
ically, Section 4 analyzes the Pigouvian expressions while Section 5 investigates the incentive
term in more detail. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 The couple
Consider a population with i = 1; :::; n couples. The proportion of couple i is i. Members of
the couple are indexed by the subscript g = f;m. Each spouse in couple i supplies `ig units
of labor at a wage rate wig. The mating pattern is such that spouses wages are positively
correlated and couples are ordered such that wig < w
i+1
g . In other words, a higher index refers
to a couple in which both spouses have a higher wage. Consequently, there is a single level of
wf associated with each level of wm. The di¤erence in wages between spouses may di¤er across
couples. Gross earnings are given by yig = w
i
g`
i
g; they are publicly observable for each spouse.
With this information, a nonlinear income tax T (yif ; y
i
m) is available. The utility of spouse g in
a couple of type i is given by
U ig = ug
 
Xig
  v  `ig ;
where Xig = fxig1; :::; xigk; :::xigKg is a the K-dimensional consumption vector of this spouse.
Technologies are linear so that producer prices are given and normalized at one. Individual
consumption levels are not observable but anonymous transactions are so that linear (propor-
tional) taxes can be levied on the consumption goods. The consumer prices of goods are given
by pk = 1 + tk where tk is the per unit tax levied on good k. Without loss of generality we
can x the tax rate on one of the goods at zero, and we set t1 = 0 so that p1 = 1. Let
p = (p1; : : : ; pk; : : : pK) = (1; : : : ; pk; : : : pK) denote the vector of consumer prices. Labor disutil-
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ity, v, satises v0 > 0 and v00 > 0, while ug is strictly increasing and concave.
Couples act cooperatively, that is they maximize the weighted sum of spousesutilities. The
weights attached to the female and male spouse in couple i, denoted by if and 
i
m, sum up to
two, i.e., if + 
i
m = 2. We assume that these weights, which reect the bargaining power of
each spouse, are exogenously given but may di¤er between couples.
For our analysis it is convenient to think about the couple as solving a three-stage optimiza-
tion problem. In a rst stage spouses choose their labor supplies and thus their gross income
levels, yif and y
i
m, which determine the couples after tax income I
i:
Ii = yif + y
i
m   T (yif ; yim):
Next, the net income Ii is allocated between spouses so that Ii = cif + c
i
m, where c
i
g is the
expenditure share of spouse g. We assume that the shares of income devoted to the individual
spouses are not publicly observable. Finally, each spouse g chooses its consumption bundles
given cig.
We solve this three-stage optimization problem by backward induction. Though fairly stan-
dard, this exercise is necessary to derive some expressions which will be useful to simplify and
interpret the di¤erent components for the optimal tax rates studied in Section 3 below.
2.1 Stage 3: consumption vectors
At this stage the yigs and c
i
gs are given. Given the separability of utility, labor supplies are of
no direct relevance for the choice of the consumption vector. Spouse g solves
max
Xig
ug
 
Xig

s.t.
KX
k=1
pkx
i
gk  cig:
Denoting the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint by ig, the rst order
conditions (FOCs) are given by
@ug(X
i
g)
@xigk
= igpk; k = 1; : : : ;K; g = f;m; i = 1; : : : ; n:
The resulting demand functions are denoted by xigk(p; c
i
g). Substituting in the utility function
uig yields spouse gs indirect utility function
V ig (p; c
i
g) = ug
 
xig1
 
p; cig

; :::xigK
 
p; cig

:
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These are completely standard Marshallian demand and indirect utility functions which satisfy
all traditional properties we know from micro theory, including Roys identity and the Slutsky
equation. In particular, note that
ig =
@V ig (p; c
i
g)
@cig
=
@ug
 
Xig

@xig1
: (1)
2.2 Stage 2: consumption shares
In stage 2, the couple determines each spouses consumption share. Recall that Ii denotes the
households disposable (after tax) income. For any bundle (Ii; yif ; y
i
m) couple i solves
max
cig
W i =
X
g=f;m
ig
"
V ig
 
p; cig
  v yig
wig
!#
s.t.
X
g=f;m
cig  Ii: (2)
Substituting the budget constraint into the objective function and di¤erentiating with respect
to cim yields
@W i
@cim
= im
i
m   ifif = 0: (3)
This equation, along with the budget constraint (2) denes the males and females consumption
levels as functions of their family income, and the price vector p: cig
 
p; Ii

. The second order
condition (SOC) is negative and given by
SOC = im
@2V im(p; c
i
m)
(@cim)
2
+ if
@2V if (p; c
i
f )
(@cif )
2
< 0: (4)
Di¤erentiating equation (3) with respect to Ii and pk yields:
@cim(p; I
i)
@Ii
=
if
@2V if (p;c
i
f)
(@cif )
2
SOC
> 0; (5)
@cif (p; I
i)
@Ii
=
im
@2V im(p;cim)
(@cim)
2
SOC
> 0; (6)
@cim(p; I
i)
@pk
=  
im
@2V im(p;cim)
@cim@pk
  if
@2V if (p;c
i
f)
@cif@pk
SOC
=  @c
i
f (p; I
i)
@pk
7 0: (7)
That is, a spouses expenditure increases in the couples disposable income while its reaction
to price changes is indeterminate. Obviously, we have @cig(p; I
i)=@ig > 0, that is a higher
bargaining power increases a spouses consumption share.
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To simplify notation let us dene
bV ig (p; Ii)  V ig (p; cig(p; Ii)); (8)
as the indirect sub-utility for spouse g and
igk
 
p; Ii
  xigk  p; cig  p; Ii (9)
as the good-k Marshallian demand function of spouse g. Both variables are a function of prices
p and disposable household income Ii.
Three properties of the couples optimal allocation of consumption will be useful for our
analysis. First, given (Ii; yif ; y
i
m) the optimal allocation of consumption depends only on overall
income Ii and on the weights (if ; 
i
m) but not on each spouses labor supply and gross income
(yif ; y
i
m). This is due to the separability of utility between consumption and labor. Second, note
that X
g=f;m
@cig
 
p; Ii

@Ii
= 1: (10)
In words, when a couples income increases by one dollar so does the sum of their total con-
sumption. Third, by using equations (3) and (10) the welfare change of an income increase for
couple i is given by
@W i
@Ii
= if
i
f
@cif (p; I
i)
@Ii
+ im
i
m
@cim(p; I
i)
@Ii
= if
i
f = 
i
m
i
m: (11)
2.3 Stage 1: labor supplies
In stage 1, the couple chooses labor supplies. Since we are not aiming at characterizing the
optimal income tax scheme, this stage is of no direct relevance to our problem. Consequently,
we restrict ourselves to stating the problem which is given by
max
Ii;yig
W i =
X
g=f;m
ig
"bV ig  p; Ii  v
 
yig
wig
!#
(12)
s.t.
X
g=f;m
yig   T
 
yim; y
i
f
  Ii  0: (13)
In words, both spouses choose their labor supplies, taking into account the tax function and
the solution of the subsequent stages. The solution is essentially identical (with some change in
notation) to that described in Section 3 of Cremer et al. (2016).
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3 Optimal tax policy
Throughout the paper we take a paternalistic approach and consider the utilitarian optimum
based on equal weights between husband and wife, if = 
i
m = 1 8 i. The welfare function is
thus given by
W =
nX
i=1
i
X
g=f;m
"bV ig  p; Ii  v
 
yig
wig
!#
: (14)
Recall that while each spouses (before tax) income yig is observable, and the distribution of types
is common knowledge, productivities, labor supplies and the spouses individual consumption
levels are not publicly observable. To be more precise, neither the spousesconsumption shares
cig, nor their respective consumption vectors are observable.
Under the considered information structure the tax instruments include a possibly nonlinear
income tax scheme, T i  T (yif ; yim), which can be positive or negative. And since anonymous
transactions are observable, consumption goods can be taxed in a linear way. This information
framework is the one typically considered in mixed taxation models.5
With the considered information structure feasible allocations must satisfy the following
incentive constraints
X
g=f;m
ig
"bV ig  p; Ii  v
 
yig
wig
!#

X
g=f;m
ig
"bV ig (p; Ib)  v
 
ybg
wig
!#
8 i 6= b: (15)
That is, any type-i couple must be prevented from mimicking any type-b couple. In addition,
the resource constraint given by
nX
i=1
i
24 X
g=f;m
yig   Ii +
KX
l=2
(pl   1)
X
g=f;m
igl
 
p; Ii
35  0 (16)
must hold.6
The optimal feasible utilitarian allocation is then obtained by maximizing (14) subject to
5See, for instance, Christiansen (1984) and Cremer and Gahvari (1997).
6We assume that taxation is purely redistributive; there is no exogenous revenue requirement. This does not
a¤ect our results.
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the constraints (15) and (16). The Lagrangian L can be written as
L =
nX
i=1
i
X
g=f;m
"bV ig  p; Ii  v
 
yig
wig
!#
+
nX
i=1
nX
b=1;b6=i
ib
8<: X
g=f;m
ig
"bV ig  p; Ii  v
 
yig
wig
!#
 
X
g=f;m
ig
"bV ig p; Ib  v
 
ybg
wig
!#9=;
+ 
nX
i=1
i
24 X
g=f;m
yig   Ii +
KX
l=2
(pl   1)
X
g=f;m
igl
 
p; Ii
35 ; (17)
where  > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint while ib  0 is the La-
grange multiplier associated with the self-selection constraint from a type-i to a type-b couple.
Throughout the paper we assume that only downward incentive constraints are binding. In other
words, when ib > 0 we always have i > b.7 The rst order conditions with respect to Ii and
pk 8 k = 2; :::K are stated in the Appendix. We show in Appendix A that optimal commodity
taxes satisfy the following system of equations
0B@ t2...
tK
1CA =  1

 1
0BBBBBBBBB@
nX
i=1
i
X
g=f;m
(1  ig)
8<:@ bV ig
 
p; Ii

@p2
+
@ bV ig  p; Ii
@Ii
X
g=f;m
xig2
9=;
...
nX
i=1
i
X
g=f;m
(1  ig)
8<:@ bV ig
 
p; Ii

@pK
+
@ bV ig  p; Ii
@Ii
X
g=f;m
xigK
9=;
1CCCCCCCCCA
+
1

 1
0BBBBBBBBB@
nX
i=1
nX
b=1;b6=i
bi
b
f
bi
f
0@ X
g=f;m
xig2  
X
g=f;m
xbig2
1A
...
nX
i=1
nX
b=1;b6=i
bi
b
f
bi
f
0@ X
g=f;m
xigK  
X
g=f;m
xbigK
1A
1CCCCCCCCCA
; (18)
where we dene big  @Vg(p; cbg
 
p; Ii

)=@cbg and x
bi
gk  xgk(p; cbg(p; Ii)).  is the aggregate
reduced (K   1) (K   1) Slutsky matrix given by
 =
0BBBBBBB@
nX
i=1
i
X
g=f;m
@ ~ig2
@p2
:::
nX
i=1
i
X
g=f;m
@ ~ig2
@pK
...
...
...
nX
i=1
i
X
g=f;m
@ ~igK
@p2
:::
nX
i=1
i
X
g=f;m
@ ~igK
@pK
1CCCCCCCA
: (19)
7This assumption is of no relevance to our formal results. In particular, the expressions for the optimal tax rates
are valid whatever the pattern of binding incentive constraints. However, it is convenient for the interpretations.
In our setting, where couples can be ranked by increasing wages of both spouses, it is in any event a natural
assumption especially with a utilitarian welfare function.
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It is reduced in the sense that the line and column pertaining to the untaxed good 1 are
removed.8 The e is used to denote the Hicksian demands as a function of prices and household
disposable income with9
@ ~igl
@pk
=
@igl
@pk
+
@igl
@Ii
X
g=f;m
xigk l = 2; :::;K: (20)
The Slutsky matrix measures the usual deadweight loss of taxation.
The rst term on the right hand side of equation (18) is the Pigouvian term. It is zero when
if = 
i
m = 1 8 i, but for the rest its interpretation merits closer investigation. The second term
on the right hand side of (18) is the incentive term which depends on the relative consumption
levels of the mimicking and the mimicked couples.
Before analyzing these terms in greater detail note that to derive the expressions in (18)
we combine the FOCs with respect to Ii and pk of the governments problem to calculate the
compensated derivative of the Lagrangian dened by
@L
@pk
+
nX
i=1
@L
@Ii
X
g=f;m
xigk:
This amounts to studying the e¤ect of a variation (dpk;dIi) such that dIi = dpk
P
g x
i
gk. This
variation leaves the welfareW i of couple i una¤ected because it does not change
P
g 
i
g
bV ig  p; Ii.
We shall now study successively the Pigouvian and the incentive terms in expression (18).
In the process it is helpful to decompose the tax rate into the incentive and the Pigouvian part,
i.e, tk = tPk + t
IC
k 8 k = 2; :::K. As we will discuss in greater detail in the following two sections,
the rst term on the right hand side in (18) determines tPk while the second one determines t
IC
k .
4 The Pigouvian term
To understand the terminology Pigouvian term note that the rst term in expression (18)
gives the optimal tax rates in the benchmark case where wages (couplestypes) are observable,
while individual consumption levels remain unobservable. In that case the incentive constraints
are not relevant; all the s are zero and tICk = 0 8k. Further observe that when all spouses
in all couples receive identical weights, so that if = 
i
m = 1 8i, the Pigouvian tax is zero for
all goods, i:e:; tPk = 0 8k. Consequently, it appears that when wages are observable the only
8This matrix  is of full rank so that its inverse exists; see Takayama (1985).
9These are standard Hicksian demands but for the couple rather than for the individual. They can be properly
dened as solutions to the couples expenditure minimization problem.
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reason to use commodity taxes is for paternalistic reasons, that is to correctthe allocation of
consumption within couples.
If individual consumption levels were observable they could be perfectly controlled through
nonlinear commodity taxes, and the rst best utilitarian allocation could be implemented, at
least as long as types are observable. The linear commodity taxes considered here only o¤er an
imperfect instrument, but as long as the spouses have di¤erent preferences, we can expect that
they play a role in achieving an intra-couple allocation that is closer to the utilitarian optimum.
Intuitively, one would expect that the Pigouvian term calls for a lower tax or even a subsidy
on the goods which are consumed in a larger proportion by the low-weight spouse. However, as
our analysis will show, this simple conjecture may be misleading and neglects some of the e¤ects
that are at work. This is because the taxes a¤ect the spousesrelative consumption shares; see
equation (7). Consider a simple example and assume that one good is mainly consumed by the
low-weight female spouse. Then, a subsidy on this good does increase her utility for a given level
of cij , but since the consumption shares will be adjusted (in a direction which is not a priori
obvious) the net impact is not necessarily unambiguous.
Before proceeding, it is also useful to recall some of the results obtained by Cremer et
al. (2016). In that paper commodity taxes were not available. The optimal income tax also
included a Pigouvian term but this one was merely intended to correct spouseslabor supplies.
The income tax in itself had no direct e¤ect on spousesrelative consumption shares. And the
fact that commodity taxes do have an impact on these consumption shares is precisely the main
addition of this paper.
4.1 General expression
Recall that the expressions in (18) measure the e¤ect of a variation (dpk;dIi) such that W i =P
g 
i
g
bV ig  p; Ii is constant for every i. In words, as consumer prices change, the couples
disposable income is adjusted to keep its utility constant. While this compensation maintains
the couples utility constant, utilities of individual spouses will, in general, not be constant. And
it is e¤ectively the impact on the individual spousesutilities which drives our results. To see
this, lets consider the Pigouvian term in (18). The expression
@ eV ig
@pk
 @
bV ig  p; Ii
@pk
+
@ bV ig  p; Ii
@Ii
X
g=f;m
xigk (21)
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measures the impact of the considered variation on the utility of spouse g = f;m of a given
couple i. Since dW i = 0, we have
if
@ eV if
@pk
+ im
@ eV im
@pk
= 0; (22)
so that @ eV if =@pk and @ eV im=@pk are of opposite sign. Solving for @ eV if =@pk (or @ eV im=@pk) and
substituting, the term pertaining to couple i in line k of the vector in the Pigouvian tax in (18)
can be written as
X
g=f;m
 
1  ig
 @ eV ig
@pk
=
 
1  
i
f
im
!
@ eV if
@pk
=
 
1  
i
m
if
!
@ eV im
@pk
: (23)
The above expression is negative when if < 
i
m and @ eV if =@pk < 0 (so that @ eV im=@pk > 0), that
is when the low-weight spouses is made worse o¤ by the (couple compensated) tax increase.
Note that this is equivalent to saying that the high-weight spouse is made better o¤.
When  is diagonal, implying that the (couple) compensated demand of any good k,
gk
 
p; Ii

, does not depend on the prices of the other goods, the Pigouvian term for good
k has the same sign as line k of the vector determined by (23).10 Consequently, it is negative
and thus reduces the tax on good k, or it favors a subsidy if a compensated price increase for
that good makes the low-weight spouse worse o¤ (so that a compensated price reduction makes
the low-weight spouse better o¤). This argument concentrates on a single couple. Substituting
from (21) and (23) shows that the Pigouvian tax for good k in (18) is given by
0B@ t
P
2
...
tPK
1CA =   1

 1
0BBBBB@
Pn
i=1 i

1  
i
f
im

@ eV if
@p2
=
Pn
i=1 i

1  im
if

@ eV im
@p2
...Pn
i=1 i

1  
i
f
im

@ eV if
@pK
=
Pn
i=1 i

1  im
if

@ eV im
@pk
1CCCCCA : (24)
In other words, the Pigouvian term pleads for a subsidy on good k if a (couple compensated)
price increase for that good makes the low-weight spouse in all couples worse o¤.
When Hicksian demands are not independent (so that is not diagonal), couple compensated
cross price e¤ects come on top of the directe¤ect just described which may then be mitigated
or reinforced. The results obtained for the independent case, however, remain valid as long as
we assume that the indirect (cross-price) e¤ects are not too signicant. We summarize this in
the following proposition.
10The diagonal term of the Slutsky matrix is negative, but the term is premultiplied by a negative sign.
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Proposition 1 Assume that  is diagonal, implying that the compensated demand of any good
does not depend on the prices of the other goods. Consider an increase in pk, compensated by an
increase in Ii to keep each couples welfare constant. The Pigouvian term pleads for a subsidy
on good k if such a compensated increase in its price makes the low-weight spouse in all couples
worse o¤. When Hicksian demands are not independent, cross price e¤ects come on top of the
direct e¤ect just described which may then be mitigated or reinforced.
We will now successively present two examples in order to obtain more insights on the sign of
the Pigouvian tax and to show under what circumstances the low-weight (high-weight) spouse
is made better (worse) o¤ by a price reduction (increase).
4.2 Three goods with exclusive consumption
Let us analyze the special case where one of the goods, say good 2, is exclusively consumed by the
female spouse while good 3 is consumed only by the male spouse. Further, we assume that both
of these goods are normal (positive income elasticity). Formally, we have xim2 = x
i
f3 = 0 8 i.
In other words, x2 does not enter the male spouses utility, while x3 is not an argument of the
female spouses utility function. The numeraire good is consumed by both spouses and, for
simplicity, we assume that these are the three only goods, i.e., K = 3.
In Appendix B we show that spouse fs change in utility can be written as
@ eV if
@p2
=
 ifif
SOC
@~xif2
@p2
 
@2uif
@xif1@x
i
f2
  p2
@2uif
(@xif1)
2
!
(25)
and
@ eV if
@p3
=
if
i
m
SOC
@~xim3
@p3

@2uim
@xim1@x
i
m3
  p3 @
2uim
(@xim1)
2

; (26)
where the terms in brackets are positive if and only if good xl for l = 2; 3 is a normal good.
Recall that the SOC is dened by equation (4). Denoting Skl the terms of the Slutsky matrix
 dened by (19), the optimal Pigouvian taxes are given by:
tP2
tP3

=   1


S22 S23
S32 S33
 1
Kf
Km

; (27)
where
Kf =
nX
i=1
i
 
1  
i
f
im
!
@ eV if
@p2
;
Km =
nX
i=1
i
 
1  
i
f
im
!
@ eV if
@p3
:
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Using Cramers rule to solve (27) yields
tP2 =  
 Kf S23Km S33

D
=
 KfS33 +KmS23
D
; (28)
tP3 =  
 S22 KfS32 Km

D
=
 KmS22 +KfS32
D
; (29)
where D is the determinant of the Slutsky matrix. The concavity of spousesutilities implies
S22; S33 < 0 and D > 0 while the sign of of the cross price e¤ects is ambiguous, that is S23 =
S32 Q 0.11
For the sake of illustration we concentrate on the case where if < 
i
h 8 i so that the female
spouse has the lower weight in all couples. When xif2 and x
i
m3 are normal goods this implies
Kf < 0 and Km > 0. Consequently, when Hicksian demands are independent (S23 = S32 = 0),
we obtain tP2 < 0 and t
P
3 > 0. In words, the Pigouvian term calls for a subsidy on the female
good and a tax on the male good. The results are exactly reversed if the low-weight spouse is
male.
Expressions (28) and (29) show that the results obtained for the diagonal case, namely
tP2 < 0 and t
P
3 > 0 are reinforced when S23 = S32 < 0, that is when goods 2 and 3 are
(Hicksian) complements for the couple. They may be reversed in the case of Hicksian substitutes
(S23 = S32 > 0) but this requires that the cross price (substitution) e¤ects outweigh the own
substitution e¤ects. Intuitively, this can be explained as follows. When the female and male good
are complements, the demand for the male good increases when the price for the female good
decreases. However, since we want to reduce his consumption level and increase her consumption
level, we need an even higher tax on the male good and an even higher subsidy on the female
good in case the two are complements.
When the goods are (Hicksian) substitutes, the expressions become ambiguous, but their
sign remains unchanged as long as the cross price e¤ects are su¢ ciently small (in absolute value
and compared to the direct e¤ects). Now, a decrease in the price of the female good will also
decrease the demand for the male good. Consequently, the desired adjustments in female and
male consumption can be accomplished with a lower subsidy on the female good and a lower
tax on the male good than when demands are independent.
In sum, when cross price e¤ects are negligible, or the good are (Hicksian) complements the
11Recall that  is the reduced Slutsky matrix. The determinant of the full Slutsky matrix would of course be
equal to zero.
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Pigouvian term pleads for subsidy on the female good like, for instance, tampons, female perfume
or female clothes while it pleads for tax on the male product.
We summarize our results of this section in the following proposition
Proposition 2 Assume that there are only three goods, one of which is exclusively consumed by
the female spouse while the other is exclusively consumed by the male spouse. If the two exclusive
goods are normal goods and if they are either (Hicksian) complements or have independent
Hicksian demands, the Pigouvian term calls for
(i) a subsidization of the good exclusively consumed by the low-weight spouse and
(ii) a taxation of the good exclusively consumed by the high-weight spouse.
The results continue to apply for the case of Hicksian substitutes as long as the cross price
substitution e¤ects are su¢ ciently small compared to the own substitution e¤ects.
4.3 K Goods with separable utility function
Suppose now that the utility ug is given by
ug
 
Xig

= h
 
xig1

+ vg
 
xig2; :::x
i
gK

; g = f;m: (30)
In words, the utility function is separable between the numeraire good 1 and the other goods.
Additionally, the sub-utility for good one is the same for both spouses, i.e., h  hf = hm.
Suppose further that h(xig1) has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), so that
A(xig1)   
@2h(xig1)=(@x
i
g1)
2
@h(xig1)=@x
i
g1
= A for g = f;m and 8 i
is constant.12 We show in Appendix C that we can write for spouse fs change in utility
@ eV if
@pk
=
if
i
f [@
2h(xif1)=(@x
i
f1)
2]
SOC
"
KX
l=2
pl
 
@~xifl
@pk
  @~x
i
ml
@pk
!#
(31)
so that for if < 
i
m the Pigouvian term pleads for a subsidy on good k if
KX
l=2
pl
@~xifl@pk
 >
KX
l=2
pl
@~ximk@pk
 , tPk < 0: (32)
In this scenario, we thus obtain that if both spouses have independent Hicksian demands, the
Pigouvian term tends to reduce the tax on good k if the demand of the spouse with the lower
12This amounts to assuming that
h(xig1) =   e Ax
i
g1 ;
where  is a constant.
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weight (assumed to be f for the sake of illustration) is more responsive to its price. In the
CARA case responsiveness is dened in terms of the slope the Hicksian demand curve. This
generalizes our exclusive consumption result; there the female good was not at all consumed by
the male so that its price elasticity was zero. The result suggests that it is not the consumption
level per se which matters but the sensitivity with respect to the price and thus to the tax or
subsidy. This is quite intuitive. When if < 
i
m female consumption levels will be lower than
socially optimal. The Pigouvian element in the tax formula then tends to reduce the di¤erence
in consumption levels (or more precisely marginal utilities). This pleads for a subsidy on the
goods where female consumption is more price responsive.
We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assuming that  is diagonal and preferences are separable in the numeraire
good and the other goods, the Pigouvian term pleads for a subsidy on good k if the subutility of
the numeraire good exhibits CARA and the slope of the Hicksian demand for good k is larger in
absolute value for the low-weight spouse.
5 The incentive term
5.1 General expression
We now turn to the interpretation of tICk given by (18). We concentrate on the case where  is
diagonal (or near diagonal so that cross price e¤ects are negligible, i:e:; Skl = 0). These terms
have a familiar avor (see e.g., Cremer and Gahvari, 2014) and their sign is essentially determined
by the comparison of the consumption levels of the mimicked and mimicking couples.13 More
precisely, the incentive term is positive and tends to increase the tax if the mimicking couple has
a larger total consumption of the considered good than the mimicked couple, that is,
P
g x
ib
gk >P
g x
i
gk. In that case the tax relaxes an otherwise binding incentive constraint because it hurts
the mimicking couple more than the couple they mimick. Otherwise, it calls for a subsidy or, at
least, a lower tax.14 The interesting question from our perspective is how these terms are a¤ected
by the couples bargaining and, specically, by the pattern of spousesbargaining weights. This
is the issue to which we now turn.
Observe that since preferences are separable between goods and labor supply, the traditional
Corlett and Hague considerations (see, for instance, Christiansen, 1984) do not matter. In
13Which in turn determines the comparison of the marginal rates of substitution between mimicked and mim-
icking couples.
14Remember that the diagonal terms of the Slutzky matrix are negative.
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other words, issues of complementarity with labor are irrelevant. What matters instead are the
spousespreferences and bargaining weights. Note that if both spouses had the same weights
in all couples, the mimicking and mimicked couplesconsumption of the considered good would
coincide,
P
g x
ib
gk =
P
g x
i
gk. Then the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem would apply and there
would be no need for commodity taxes.15
Note that xigk can e¤ectively also be written as x
i
gk = x
i
gk(p; c
i
g(p; I
i; ig)). Consequently, we
can write:
X
g=f;m
xigk(p; c
i
g(p; I
i; i)) = xifk(p; c
i
f (p; I
i; if )) + x
i
mk(p; I
i   cif (p; Ii; if ))
so that
@
P
g x
i
gk(p; c
i
g(p; I
i; i))
@if
=
 
@xifk
@cif
  @x
i
mk
@cim
!
@cif
@if
: (33)
Equation (33) is positive if
@xifk=@c
i
f > @x
i
mk=@c
i
m (34)
and negative otherwise. Condition (34) is satised if the female spouses consumption of the
considered good is more responsive to income than that of the male spouse. In other words, the
Engel curve has a higher slope for the female than for the male spouse.
1. If @xifk=@c
i
f > @x
i
mk=@c
i
m for every i, and 
i
f < 
b
f (plausible case in which couple of type
b is richer) then X
g=f;m
xigk <
X
g=f;m
xbigk , tICk > 0
so that the incentive term calls for a tax on good k. (this case also applies if @xifk=@c
i
f <
@ximk=@c
i
m for every i and 
i
f > 
b
f ).
2. If @xifk=@c
i
f < @x
i
mk=@c
i
m for every i, and 
i
f < 
b
f thenX
g=f;m
xigk >
X
g;fm
xbigk , tICk < 0
so that the incentive term calls for a subsidy on good k. (this case also applies if @xifk=@c
i
f >
@ximk=@c
i
m for every i and 
i
f > 
b
f ).
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
15With equal weights, the Pigouvian term would also vanish.
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Proposition 4 Assume that  is diagonal. The incentive term pleads for a tax (subsidy) on
good k if
(i) the low-weight spouses consumption of good k is more (less) responsive to income changes
and the weight of this spouse is increasing in wages.
(ii) the low-weight spouses consumption of good k is less (more) responsive to income changes
and the weight of this spouse is decreasing in wages.
5.2 Three goods with exclusive consumption
To illustrate the above results it is interesting to return to the exclusive consumption case
considered in Subsection 4.2. Recall that good 2 is the good exclusively consumed by f while
good 3 is the good exclusively consumed by m. We thus have by denition @xim2=@c
i
m =
@xif3=@c
i
f = 0 and a couples total consumption of any of these goods is simply that of one of
the spouses. Assume again that f is the low-weight spouse in all couples, i.e., if < 
i
m.
16 We
then know from Subsection 4.2 that the Pigouvian term calls for a subsidy on good 2 and a tax
on good 3. These e¤ects are reinforced by the incentive term if if decreases with wi, which
automatically implies that im increases with wi. In that case the mimicking couple will have a
lower consumption of the female good and the incentive term also calls for a subsidy.
However, the case where if decreases does not appear to be the empirically most compelling;
see, e.g., Couprie (2007). And when if increases with wages we get the opposite result so that
the incentive term goes against the Pigouvian term. Intuitively, Pigouvian and redistributive
considerations then contradict each other. The female good, which ought to be subsidized on
Pigouvian grounds is also consumed in larger proportion by high-wage couples (because f has
a higher weight there) and this makes it a candidate for taxation on redistributive grounds.
So the incentive term can be expected to be nil for tampons and we can make a case for a
subsidy on tampons for Pigouvian reasons. The incentive term does, however, countervail the
Pigouvian term when it comes to female products like perfume, or clothes since these goods can
be expected to be consumed in larger proportion by higher wage couples.
Proposition 5 Assume that there are only three goods, one of which is exclusively consumed by
the female spouse while the other is exclusively consumed by the male spouse. If the two exclusive
goods are normal goods and Hicksian cross price e¤ects are su¢ ciently small, the Pigouvian term
is
16The opposite case is exactly symmetric.
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(i) reinforced by the incentive term when the bargaining power of the low-weight spouse
decrease with wages and
(ii) is dampened when the bargaining power of the low-weight spouse increases with wages.
6 Summary and conclusion
This paper has studied the design of commodity taxes, in a world where consumption and labor
supply decisions are made by couples according to a bargaining procedure between spouses, and
where an optimal income tax is also available. We have shown that the expressions for the tax
rates include Pigouvian and incentive terms. The Pigouvian term arises when a spouses social
weight di¤ers from her weight within the couple. The incentive term has a familiar avor in that
it depends on the mimicker and mimicked couplesrespective consumption levels. Interestingly,
though, these di¤erences in consumption levels depend on the spouses respective bargaining
weight. In particular, whether the weight of the low-weight spouse increases or decreases with
wages has been shown to be of crucial importance. The role of the two terms is most apparent
in the case where some goods are consumed exclusively by one of the spouses. Supposing, for
instance, that the female spouse has the lower bargaining weight, we have found conditions
under which the Pigouvian term calls for a subsidization of the female good, and a taxation
of the male good. However, when the weight of the female spouse increases with wages, and
when the demand for the female is su¢ ciently elastic with respect to the female weight the
good will tend to be consumed in larger proportion by more productive couples. Consequently,
the incentive term makes it a candidate for taxation. Intuitively, under these circumstances a
subsidization of the female good would be regressive. The incentive term then mitigates the
Pigouvian term and may even reverse it. This is likely to be the case for perfumes while the
weight (and thus income) elasticity is likely to be small for tampons so that one can expect the
Pigouvian term to dominate. To sum up, our paper clearly provides support for a reduced VAT
rate, or even a subsidy on tampons (as long as the female spouse has a lower bargaining weight),
but as much someof its authors may regret, it does not make a case for the subsidization of
expensive perfumes or jewelry.
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Appendix
A Derivation of expression (18)
First-order conditions. Di¤erentiating L with respect to Ii and pk yields (the arguments of
some functions are dropped where no confusion can arise)
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= i
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where the tax on good 1 is xed at zero.
Simplication and rearrangement of (A1). Di¤erentiation of the weighted sum of
equation (8) with respect to Ii yields
X
g=f;m
ig
@ bV ig  p; Ii
@Ii
=
X
g=f;m
ig
@V ig (p; c
i
g(p; I
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@cig
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@Ii
:
Using equations (10) and (11), this implies that
X
g=f;m
ig
@ bV ig  p; Ii
@Ii
= ig
i
g: (A3)
Proceeding in the same way and using Roys identity, we have
X
g=f;m
ig
@ bV ig  p; Ii
@pk
=  igig
X
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xigk; (A4)
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@ bV bg  p; Ii
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X
g=f;m
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where we dene
big  @Vg(p; cbg
 
p; Ii

)=@cbg and x
bi
gk  xgk(p; cbg(p; Ii)) for g = f;m:
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Rewriting equation (A1) as
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and making use of equations (A3)-(A6) yields
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Multiplying (A7) by
P
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i
gk and summing over i yields
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Simplication and rearrangement of (A2). We now turn to the FOC with respect to
prices. We can rearrange equation (A2) as follows
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which using equations ( A3)-(A6) implies
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Derivation of the compensated derivative of the Lagrangian. Next we calculate the
compensated derivative of the Lagrangian dened as
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Rearranging (A10) and noting that tl = pl   1, we obtain
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for every k = 1:::K: Rewriting the system of equations ( A11) in matrix notation and premulti-
plying by  1 yields expression (18) in the main text.
B Derivation of equation (25) and (26)
Using Roys identity equation (21) can be written as
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!
xifk + x
i
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@cif
@Ii
#
(A12)
22
With equations (4), (6), (7) and (10), equation (A12) can be written as
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(A13)
We have
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where
@~xifl
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=
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+ xifk
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Similarly, we can show that
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Substituting equations (A14) and (A15) into (A13) and inserting into (A12) yields
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=
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(A16)
where @2U ig=@x
i
g1@x
i
gl   pl@2U ig=(@xig1)2 > 0 if and only if xl is a normal normal. Recall that
SOC is dened by equation (4).
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C Proof of expressions (31)
When utility is given by (30), equation (A16) can be written as
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(A17)
Factoring out  @2h(xif1)=(@xif1)2 and using ifif = imim, equation (A17) can be written as
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Noting that ig = @h(x
i
g1)=@x
i
g1 and given that h is CARA, the above equation simplies to
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